The ongoing discussions about a potential civil nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia remain shrouded in uncertainty. The Biden administration insists that the deal is contingent upon the Kingdom normalizing relations with Israel, although this stipulation is not explicitly mentioned in the agreement text. Now that Congress has access to this text, lawmakers should carefully evaluate its implications and advocate for necessary modifications.
The Risks of Nuclear Cooperation
The proposed 30-year nuclear deal provides U.S. firms the opportunity to construct new reactors in Saudi Arabia and potentially establish uranium enrichment facilities. Such facilities are essential for producing fissile material, which could be utilized to create nuclear weapons. Under the agreement, both nations will have a window of up to two years to determine the viability of an indigenous enrichment program, weighing both commercial interests and U.S. national security considerations. This could leave the sensitive technology open to misuse, with Congress having a limited timeframe of 90 days to challenge the agreement before it becomes effective automatically.
Pursuing this agreement poses significant risks. Historically, the U.S. and other nuclear suppliers have refrained from sharing enrichment and reprocessing technologies with clients to prevent them from developing nuclear weapons capabilities. Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has boldly stated that if Iran develops nuclear weapons, his country “would have to” follow suit. The prospect of Saudi Arabia acquiring enrichment capabilities could create a domino effect, encouraging other countries in the Middle East to pursue similar ambitions, thus undermining regional stability.
Why the Concession?
The rationale behind providing such concessions to Saudi Arabia remains questionable. Other international suppliers have not indicated intentions to extend similar access to enrichment technologies. Nations like Russia and China compete primarily on cost rather than technology transfer. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has sought U.S. nuclear technology for nearly twenty years, suggesting that they have had ample opportunity to explore alternatives. Deviating from established norms could open the door for U.S. competitors, such as Russia, to gain traction in the Middle East, where they are already engaging in major reactor projects in nations like Egypt and Turkey. This shift could seriously weaken the U.S. stance against Iran acquiring domestic enrichment capabilities.
While the likelihood of a joint resolution opposing the agreement may be slim, Congress should seize this opportunity to demand increased transparency and improved safeguards against nuclear proliferation.
Congress’s Role
Congress has an obligation to meticulously assess the classified documents associated with the agreement, including several secret side letters. Lawmakers must seek clarity on crucial questions, such as whether Saudi Arabia would be allowed to establish an independent enrichment program if the joint study deems it unnecessary. It’s vital that Congress be involved in this study to ensure comprehensive evaluation of the reasons against allowing uranium fuel production.
Furthermore, Congress should advocate for Saudi Arabia to sign an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to facilitate expanded international inspections. If this does not occur, Congress must pressure the administration to develop expedited measures with the IAEA to investigate any potential indications that Saudi Arabia may pursue a covert enrichment or weapons program. Subsequently, it’s essential to establish severe repercussions for any violations, including asset freezes and restrictions on access to U.S. technology.
In conclusion, while the administration deserves credit for seeking to enhance U.S. nuclear exports, this objective should not come at the risk of escalating nuclear proliferation. Congress must articulate its concerns and take a stand for responsible governance in nuclear cooperation agreements.