Iraqi security agencies are closely monitoring the emergence of small, covert groups associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These clandestine cells are operating independently from Iraq’s traditional armed factions and are responsible for a series of drone attacks not only against targets in Erbil but also in neighboring nations like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait.
New Strategies in Iranian-Backed Operations
Recent sources indicate that this network began taking shape as discussions about the disarmament of Iraqi armed groups gained momentum, spurred by pressure from Baghdad and Washington. In response, select individuals from larger factions have been reassembled into smaller, more compartmentalized units consisting of five to ten members each. This strategic shift aims to reduce detectability, providing the IRGC with a more discreet operational framework that bypasses conventional leadership structures.
The evolution of this operational model can be traced back to the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel. It led to the formation of an umbrella organization known as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, representing various Iran-backed factions. This coalition not only declared solidarity with Gaza but also initiated aggressive actions against U.S. military positions in Iraq and Syria, later expanding its focus to Israeli targets. Groups like Ashab al-Kahf and Awliya al-Dam took public responsibility for various assaults, thus allowing major factions to distance themselves from these actions.
Challenges Faced by Iraqi Security Forces
The pressure on Iraq’s leading factions to pivot toward domestic political engagement has caused the IRGC to seek alternatives to larger, more visible groups. This necessitates a reliance on smaller, low-profile cells that can evade detection and effectively carry out limited operations, primarily drone strikes. In this new structure, many members either formerly belonged to factions planning to surrender their arms or have recently undergone advanced training in Iran.
Cohesion within these cells is maintained through a direct chain of command to the IRGC, specifically via Haji Hamed, who has been instrumental in liaising with Iraqi armed groups since his arrival in the wake of the Islamic State’s territorial gains in 2014. Intelligence sources suggest that this structure complicates efforts to engage in negotiations or counteractions, as these groups lack formal leaders.
As these cells predominantly operate anonymously—often in civilian vehicles and without military apparel—tracking their movements becomes a significant challenge for Iraqi security forces. Their capacity to shift drones between locations further complicates intelligence operations aimed at preempting attacks.
Increasing Risks for Iraqi Government
The lack of a discernible leadership framework makes these networks particularly alarming for Iraqi authorities. Unlike traditional armed factions, which have identifiable leaders that can be negotiated with, these groups operate in a clandestine manner that makes it difficult to cut off their support. Many members are driven by ideological beliefs rather than financial motives, escalating concerns regarding their loyalty and resilience against recruitment measures.
A recent military strike in Diyala province unveiled fragments of this elusive structure, hitting a camp where several Iranian advisors were present. This incident solidified the link between the cells and the IRGC, as the network was designed with each group operating in isolation, their sole interconnection stemming from Iranian oversight.
As the September 30 deadline for disarmament of armed factions draws near, the likelihood of increased activities by these discretionary cells grows. The potential transfer of unaccounted weaponry from larger factions to smaller, more decentralized groups poses significant risks, prompting urgent reassessment by Iraqi intelligence and security agencies regarding the implications for national security and stability.