On October 21, Yadollah Javani, the political deputy of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, issued a stark warning regarding the vulnerability of critical internet infrastructure in the Strait of Hormuz. He indicated that should Iranian infrastructure face aggression, vital internet cables in this strategic waterway could be targeted. Such pronouncements raise questions about the significance of internet connectivity in an area heavily tied to global oil and gas shipments.
The Strategic Importance of the Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz plays a pivotal role in global energy trading, yet its relevance for internet traffic is often overstated. According to the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), only five active submarine cable segments traverse this waterway, contributing to less than one percent of the world’s international bandwidth. TeleGeography, a telecommunications research organization, identifies three crucial cable systems that can be found along these underwater routes: Asia Africa Europe-1 (AAE-1), FALCON, and Gulf Bridge International (GBI). Most data flows between Europe and East Asia are channeled through the Red Sea instead of Hormuz, signaling that its strategic importance does not directly correlate with internet connectivity.
Regional Implications of Potential Cable Damage
TeleGeography also points out that cables linked to Iran’s neighbors primarily run through Omani waters due to longstanding political tensions. An attack on these cables would more adversely affect regional nations such as Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, rather than causing widespread issues for global internet connectivity. While these Gulf states do have alternative terrestrial connections, damage to the submarine cables could disrupt local communications and have immediate ramifications for economic activities in the region. In contrast, Saudi Arabia relies less on these routes, as most of its bandwidth flows through systems along its Red Sea coast.
If cables were damaged, rerouting could mitigate internet outages, although it might lead to slower connection speeds and increased latency. The broader global internet ecosystem is designed to withstand localized failures, relying on a myriad of both terrestrial and submarine routes to maintain service continuity. Experts agree that while disruptions are undesirable, they usually do not result in a complete internet shutdown.
The Limitations of Threats and Legal Protections
Javani’s assertions may reflect a strategic posture rather than a practical operational strategy. Mehdi Saremifar, a tech expert based in Canada, has criticized the Revolutionary Guards’ claims, indicating that they often miscalculate the actual volume of internet traffic passing through these crucial cables. He outlines that while the Persian Gulf nations’ connectivity could be affected, the impact on global internet traffic would be marginal. Alternative paths via Saudi Arabia and Egypt could help absorb any displaced traffic.
Furthermore, international law protects submarine cables under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Legal parameters guide what constitutes an attack on civilian infrastructure, making any intentional damage potentially subject to legal ramifications. Even during armed conflicts, there exists significant legal documentation to ensure that civilian communications infrastructure remains safeguarded unless it qualifies as a military target.
In summary, while the Revolutionary Guards’ comments raise important discussions about internet security in the Persian Gulf, the reality is that a substantial portion of global internet traffic does not depend on the Strait of Hormuz. The region’s local economic impact may be significant, but global connectivity remains resilient and adaptable, equipped with the necessary redundancies to avert total shutdowns. Thus, while threats to these infrastructures can create ripples in communications, they do not pose an existential risk to the global internet.