Sara Harmouch, the CEO of H9 Defense and an adjunct professor at George Washington University, emphasizes that the evolving relationship between Iran and al-Qaeda is no longer merely a background detail. This connection has substantial implications, especially given the rising tensions in the region. Harmouch asserts that al-Qaeda’s discreet operational model allows it to act as a proxy for Iran while maintaining plausible deniability.
The Rising Threat of al-Qaeda
Intelligence reports circulating within Middle Eastern circles, though not yet validated by US or Western officials, indicate that Saif al-Adel, the unofficial leader of al-Qaeda who resides in Iran, may be orchestrating attacks as regional hostilities escalate. This strategy could benefit both Iran and al-Qaeda: Iran could deny its involvement in the events, while al-Qaeda could regain a prominent role in global geopolitical conflicts. Harmouch points out that Iran has historically facilitated terrorist operations, recalling its involvement in logistics and funding for the September 11 attacks. Given the pressures Iran currently faces amid ongoing warfare, it would not be surprising for Iran to leverage al-Qaeda once more.
The findings of the 9/11 Commission highlight the complexity of Iran’s involvement. While the Commission determined that several hijackers transited through Iran, it concluded that there was no indication Tehran had foreknowledge of the attacks. However, a US federal court adjudicated Iran liable in a civil case initiated by victims’ families, a judgment Iran chose not to contest.
Bridging Sectarian Divides
Harmouch suggests that Washington’s understanding of the dynamic between Sunni and Shia Islam remains overly simplistic. She argues that al-Qaeda is increasingly becoming “Iran’s ace in the hole,” a sentiment that, when expressed previously, met skepticism from some media editors who were reluctant to acknowledge cooperation between these historically opposing factions. She stresses that pragmatism often outweighs ideological divides, a theme echoed through current trends in regional alliances.
Recent events, such as al-Qaeda ceasing hostilities against the Houthis in Yemen while also establishing relations with al-Shabaab in Somalia, lend weight to her assertions. Even though al-Qaeda publicly refutes claims of collaboration with the Houthis, Harmouch interprets these denials as tactical cover rather than a genuine disaffiliation.
The Shadowy Leadership of Saif al-Adel
Harmouch also notes that al-Adel’s discreet nature contributes to the silence surrounding al-Qaeda’s activities. Unlike Osama bin Laden, who thrived on media exposure, al-Adel remains in Iran, operating largely out of the public eye. A recent 52-minute video released by al-Qaeda featured archival footage and quotes from al-Adel’s writings, signaling a careful management of his image.
This partnership between Iran and al-Qaeda reportedly solidified following the events of 2001 when key al-Qaeda figures sought refuge in Iran. Although some were detained, al-Adel was afforded a degree of freedom, staying close to influential leaders within the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Harmouch cites historical instances, such as the Riyadh bombings of 2003 and plots aimed at targets in North America, as evidence of an enduring partnership that has evolved rather than concluded.
In conclusion, Harmouch asserts that any diplomatic deal or intensified US military campaign will likely not resolve the underlying issues. Iran has shown resilience by using attrition strategies, and in situations where it cannot exert control externally, it tends to turn inward. While concerns about sleeper cells in the US linger, their potential threats may be utilized by Tehran as leverage, emerging only if deemed necessary. Ultimately, she cautions against the notion of ‘winning’ a war with Iran, suggesting that as long as Iran remains active in the geopolitical arena, it considers itself the victor.