The growing discourse on establishing a ministry for artificial intelligence (AI) in Iraq underscores a complex interplay of governance and political maneuvering. Despite the significant potential of AI, the country faces considerable challenges in integrating this technology effectively into its state institutions. Recent insights from Iraq’s National Artificial Intelligence Center reveal that only a fraction of the state’s agencies have the necessary strategies to embrace this transformative technology.
Proposals Under Consideration
The idea of introducing a dedicated AI ministry gained traction this week, as former lawmaker Amir al-Maamouri disclosed discussions among political factions regarding changes to Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s incomplete cabinet. These conversations extend to potential divisions within the existing Ministry of Culture, Tourism, and Antiquities, alongside the proposed portfolio for AI or digital investment. Remarkably, nine out of the total 23 ministries within al-Zaidi’s government are still led by temporary officials five months post-appointment.
In Iraq, cabinet positions are often negotiated through a system known as muhasasa, which allocates ministries based on sectarian and ethnic representation in parliament. Critics frequently interpret the move to introduce a new AI ministry as a tactical political engagement rather than a genuine commitment to technological advancement. Each new ministry could enhance the portfolio market, fostering further political dynamics instead of focusing on effective governance.
The Lack of Formal Support
So far, no formal proposal for the new AI ministry has been made. Hassan Wraiwish al-Asadi, a significant parliamentary figure, has acknowledged that the creation of such a ministry has not yet been submitted to the legislative assembly. Given the current economic landscape and austerity measures, he argues that such initiatives may be premature, suggesting that AI policies could fall under the purview of existing ministries like Communications or Higher Education.
A government source, who preferred anonymity, indicated that political figures had floated the idea in an effort to align Iraq with evolving global trends. However, this notion remains unofficial, with no immediate plans to appoint a minister or establish the ministry, signaling a potential revisit under a future administration. Despite requests for comments, neither the government spokesman nor the National Artificial Intelligence Center provided input on the matter.
Assessing National Readiness
The stark reality of Iraq’s readiness for AI is revealed through the government’s own findings. According to research cited by academic Saif al-Karawi, the majority of state institutions lack clear strategies for AI implementation. While there have been attempts to develop a national AI strategy since 2024, progress has been slow and hindered by bureaucratic revisions, leaving the country ill-prepared compared to global benchmarks. In fact, Iraq ranked 128th out of 188 countries in the 2025 Government AI Readiness Index, underscoring systemic weaknesses in governance compared to technological infrastructure.
Mounting challenges extend beyond the bureaucratic realm. Chronic electricity shortages severely limit the operational capacity needed for high-powered computing and data management integral to AI programs. A new ministry would face significant hurdles if foundational issues—like reliable electricity—fail to be addressed.
Weighing the Pros and Cons of a New Institution
Former lawmaker Hussein Arab has suggested that establishing an e-governance or AI-focused ministry could prove advantageous, particularly as Iraq grapples with fragmented electronic systems among its ministries. It’s crucial to consider practical solutions, such as staffing the new entity with existing civil servants, to avoid creating a cumbersome bureaucracy. Academic perspectives further advocate for incremental progress, emphasizing the need for a realistic evaluation of the nation’s resources, telecommunications, and educational frameworks.
Contrasting international models reveal various ways to incorporate AI governance. For example, countries like Kazakhstan and the UAE utilize existing ministries to address AI needs, suggesting that integrated systems of data and research might provide greater utility than simply establishing a standalone ministry. Ultimately, effective spending of resources and establishing quantifiable goals are critical, ensuring that Iraq doesn’t repeat past failures.
In conclusion, while discussions surrounding a new AI ministry are intriguing, they also expose a more profound issue: the underlying deficiencies in Iraq’s institutional frameworks. As political negotiations unfold, the challenge remains: can Iraq bridge the technological divide and equip itself for an AI-driven future?