The ongoing conflict between the US and Israel on one side and Iran on the other has lasted over five months, with the chances of a peaceful resolution appearing increasingly uncertain. Recent statements from Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasize the absence of direct negotiations with the United States, while Tehran continues to issue aggressive rhetoric. Many Western analysts, particularly on the political right, argue that Iran’s anti-American ideology inhibits its ability to strike a deal. However, this notion may overlook critical aspects of Iran’s political landscape and decision-making processes.
The Complex Nature of Iranian Ideology
To understand Iran’s position, one must examine both its constitution and historical behavior. The Islamic Republic is not solely driven by ideology; it places a high value on regime survival above all else. The current regime would not hesitate to pursue negotiations with the US or Israel, provided such a move aligns with its overarching goal: preserving its own existence.
Historically, Iranian Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini established the principle that the Islamic state’s preservation took precedence over all else, including religious obligations. His revisions to the constitution in 1989 led to the formation of the Council for Discerning the Expediency of the System, which was tasked with making decisions that would benefit the governing structure. This emphasized that safeguarding the regime—referred to as hefz-e nezam—was paramount, allowing for deviations from religious dogma when circumstances required.
Iran frequently presents its anti-imperialist stance as a moral endeavor rooted in opposition to Western domination, garnering sympathy beyond its borders. However, this ideology does not consistently apply to its regional actions. The Islamic Republic has utilized its resources to exert influence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Palestine, showcasing a selective application of its anti-imperialist doctrine. While Iran stands against perceived external threats, it has occasionally subordinated the principles of sovereignty and self-determination in its pursuit of regional dominance.
Negotiating Without Appearing Weak
The Iranian regime operates on two key levels: a resolute enmity toward the US and Israel, and strategic calculations centered on regime preservation. This duality creates a dilemma: how to reach an agreement with adversaries while maintaining an uncompromised public image. Historical examples illustrate that even apparent absolutes can be reconsidered when survival is at stake.
For instance, after the Iran-Iraq War, Khomeini accepted a ceasefire, declaring it more detrimental than poison. During moments of significant pressure, such as post-9/11, Iran engaged in clandestine dealings with the US, showing that hardline rhetoric can be moderated under existential threats. This year has tested these mechanisms further, as regime changes and military actions have led to precarious agreements aimed at de-escalation between Iran and the US.
In June, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, which aimed to reduce hostilities and provide sanctions relief. Even as the regime navigates this treacherous landscape, the core objective remains intact: maintaining its hold on power, while strategic concessions are interpreted as steps to adapt rather than abandon longstanding ideologies.
The Repercussions of Accommodation
A potential agreement between Iran and the US could reduce the likelihood of war and help alleviate the economic strain on the Iranian populace. However, simply lifting sanctions won’t automatically enhance personal freedoms for citizens. Historical patterns suggest that authoritarian regimes can leverage any economic relief to bolster their repressive capabilities instead of pursuing political reform.
This presents a misleading binary: either confront the Islamic Republic to dismantle it or negotiate with it for moderation. The more plausible scenario may involve a pragmatic accommodation that secures the regime while maintaining minimal progress toward democracy. This raises an unsettling prospect where Iran successfully defends itself against foreign adversaries yet continues to exert significant control over its own citizens.
Those questioning whether the Islamic Republic might compromise its adversarial stances in exchange for survival should reconsider Article 112. Its presence within the constitution since 1989 indicates that the answer leans heavily toward prioritizing regime preservation. As the conflict evolves, understanding the significance of Iran’s constitutional framework offers crucial insights into potential outcomes in international relations.