Eyal Tsir Cohen, the former head of international relations for the Mossad, recently stated on Army Radio that he could not confirm any communications from Egypt or the United Arab Emirates (UAE) warning Israel or Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu before or after the events of October 7, 2023. This statement contradicts previous accounts suggesting that such warnings had occurred.
Lack of Warnings Prior to October 7
Cohen expressed, “I do not recall any reports regarding a warning from MBZ (Mohammed bin Zayed, President of the UAE) or Sufian Abu Zaida (a former senior Fatah official).” He further noted that he did not remember any meetings with Abbas Kamel, the head of Egyptian intelligence, that discussed any potential threats. He mentioned that while Kamel could have visited Israel discreetly, he had held frequent discussions with Kamel and his team post-October 7, with no specifics on such a visit being raised at any time.
Divergent Views Among Former Officials
Danny Yatom, another former head of the Mossad, also weighed in on the discussion, mentioning a trip that Netanyahu took to the UAE just days after October 7. Yatom suggested that this visit might have been in response to warnings purportedly issued prior to the attack. He indicated that there were “two or three different sources that warned,” implying that the information cannot simply be dismissed.
Reports on Alleged Warnings
Despite Cohen’s assertions, multiple reports claim that warnings were relayed to Israel prior to the October 7 incident. Notably, The Atlantic reported that Kamel allegedly visited Israel about 11 days before the attack and communicated urgent concerns that Hamas was planning a significant military operation. This visit reportedly occurred on September 26, during a gathering of senior Israeli officials in Jerusalem.
Messages from Hamas Leadership
Additionally, Zaida revealed his own interactions with Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, claiming he passed on a warning three weeks before the attack, during a meeting on September 14. Sinwar reportedly advised that Hamas would soon present demands that could lead to significant upheaval and urged for Israel to prepare for forthcoming changes.
In light of these conflicting accounts, while Cohen denies any knowledge of warnings, other former intelligence officials assert that substantial alerts were indeed provided. This discrepancy raises important questions regarding the flow of intelligence and the decision-making processes involving Israeli leadership.
UAE President’s Alleged Warning
Reports from Haaretz also suggest that Zayed warned Netanyahu directly about a major operation by Hamas, approximately a week and a half before the attack. This warning, however, reportedly did not reach Israeli intelligence or military agencies, signaling potential lapses in communication channels.
Conclusion
The dialogues surrounding the events leading up to October 7 highlight a significant disconnect in intelligence-sharing among nations, particularly between Israel, Egypt, and the UAE. With key figures like Cohen denying warnings and others endorsing their existence, the complexity of geopolitical relationships continues to shape the narrative in the region. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for comprehending the broader implications of intelligence effectiveness and inter-state relations in the area.