On February 17, former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett made a significant statement at the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations in Jerusalem, coining the phrase: “Turkey is the new Iran.” This remark has garnered attention as it signifies a potential shift in Israeli strategic outlook. Bennett accused Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of attempting to “encircle Israel” and claimed that Turkey, along with Qatar, is fostering a “Muslim Brotherhood axis” that resembles Iran’s proxy structure but is rooted in a “hostile Sunni axis” supported by nuclear-armed Pakistan. While these statements might be viewed as politically motivated, they are part of a broader ideological trend within Israeli political and security circles.
Emerging Threat Assessments
Bennett’s rhetoric aligns with findings from an internal Israeli defense report that few outside the nation’s military establishment have carefully examined. The Nagel Committee, tasked with evaluating long-term defense strategies, highlighted the risks posed by a Turkey-aligned Syria, suggesting it could morph into an even greater danger than the Iranian threat. This assessment has now permeated political discussions, lending credibility to Bennett’s statements. Former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant also added to the dialogue on February 27, advocating for Western countries to rethink arms sales to Turkey, despite its position as NATO’s second-largest military force.
Geopolitical Alignments
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has actively joined this escalating rhetoric amid diminishing support at home following the U.S.-brokered ceasefire with Iran. He introduced a “hexagon” of regional alliances, including Greece and Cyprus, aimed at countering what he labeled an “emerging radical Sunni axis.” The historical grievances these nations have against Turkey regarding maritime rights and the division of Cyprus provide a strategic backdrop, although it remains contentious whether Turkey genuinely presents a threat on par with Iran.
Differing Perspectives on Turkey
Interestingly, Turkey has maintained a relatively restrained posture in this evolving narrative. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan addressed concerns about Turkey’s involvement in Syria, refuting the idea of a Turkish takeover and instead advocating for cooperation. His remarks underscore an understanding that perceptions of threat are reciprocal; Israel views Turkish movements as encroaching from Syria and Gaza, while Ankara perceives Israeli expansions in the Golan Heights and Eastern Mediterranean as attempts to encircle Turkey.
Not all in Israel’s security community share the dominant view on Turkey’s threat level. Former ambassador Alon Pinkas criticized the tendency among Israeli politicians to portray constant threats, arguing that Turkey has never explicitly called for Israel’s destruction. Thus, the relationship, albeit strained, remains diplomatically formal rather than openly hostile, making the comparisons to Iran less straightforward.
The Washington Perspective
Meanwhile, the narrative surrounding Turkey is gaining traction in American think tanks. Michael Rubin from the American Enterprise Institute has speculated that over the next decade, Turkey could evolve into a nation similar to contemporary Iran. Similarly, Bradley Martin from the Pentagon’s Near East South Asia Center has suggested reevaluating Turkey’s NATO membership. Critics argue that such positions may be part of a larger “narrative manufacturing” scheme to depict Erdoğan as a significant regional menace, regardless of the factual basis for such claims.
While tensions between Turkey and Israel are palpable, both nations seem to avoid direct conflict. The ongoing factors—Turkish military installations in Syria, disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Turkey’s support for Hamas—create undeniable friction. However, the prospect of a conflict involving a NATO member and a nuclear-armed Israel remains unappealing to both sides. What’s becoming increasingly evident is that the viewpoint of “Turkey as the next Iran” is not merely fringe but may soon be regarded as a principal aspect of Israel’s strategic framework in the post-Iran geopolitical landscape.